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Defining Civil and Political Rights: The Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee by
Alex Conte, Scott Davidson and Richard Burchill. Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004. 257pp.

The publication of this new book on the jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee
comes on the heels of the 2004 Oxford University Press publication, The International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Second Edition), edited by
Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz and Melissa Castan. It also appears shortly before Manfred
Nowak’s masterful 2005 revision of U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR
Commentary (Second Edition).
The editors of Defining Civil and Political Rights provide a narrative account of how the United
Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) has developed and continues to develop its
jurisprudence under the individual communication procedure contained in the Optional Protocol
to the Covenant, from the time of its establishment up to the conclusions of its 77th session in
April 2003.
This edited volume explores such topics as: self determination; democratic and civil rights; the
judicial process; privacy; non-discrimination; and rights of the family and children. The volume
also includes four appendices: the text of the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights
(ICCPR); its first Optional Protocol; the ratification status of the ICCPR and the Optional
Protocol (as of July 7, 2003); and a Model Complaint Form.
The introduction provides a brief history of the ICCPR, the nature of the rights and the
obligations of the States Parties and the functions of the Committee. The second chapter sets
forth the procedure for the processing of individual petitions by the HRC under the Optional
Protocol. It points out that communications must be from individual victims who must be subject
to the jurisdiction of the State. The Committee does not consider complaints from juridical
persons (such as corporations) and does not accept petitions from non-governmental
organizations or collective victims. Also, an unrelated third party, having no relation to the
victim, cannot submit a communication on the victim’s behalf.
The book is an interesting, readable narrative describing the evolution of the jurisprudence
regarding the eight sets of rights selected. It is most interesting in those areas in which it reveals
a critical eye. The Introduction notes that the HRC has been hampered in the development of a
comprehensive jurisprudence by two main factors: that early communications came mainly from
a few states, such as Uruguay and Zaire, and; these communications dealt with gross and
systematic violations of the right to be free from torture, the right to liberty and security of the
person, the right to due process, and so forth. The one drawback, perhaps, is the failure of the
authors to locate the evolution of the HRC’s jurisprudence in its respective historical and
comparative contexts. For example, regions such as the Americas returned to democratic forms
of government, and as a consequence the nature of the communications changed from dealing
with gross and systematic violations under dictatorships to issues involving more mundane
questions such as deprivation of judicial due process in democratic states.
The authors are critical of the jurisprudence that has been developed by the HRC’s leap outside
the confines of civil and political rights and find that concerning issues of discrimination
(ICCPR, Art. 26) “there have been certain views in which the evident desire for consensus has
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led to less than satisfactory legal reasoning. Indeed, some views have been so brief as to be
almost completely devoid of legal reasoning” (9). For example, in the European system, in
contrast, the non-discrimination provision is a “parasitic right” which must be linked to other
substantive rights protected by the European Convention (162).
The authors are also critical of the HRC’s failure to explain in the landmark Thompson v St
Vincent and the Grenadines case (88 et seq.), why a mandatory death sentence involved a
violation of article 6 (right to life) or any other provision of the Covenant, since the Committee
had dealt with many communications from persons sentenced to death under mandatory death
penalty legislation and never before found a violation on the basis of the law. The reason why the
Committee changed its jurisprudence in this area has to do with a decision of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), cited in the Thompson decision. The lawyers
representing Thompson also represented another death row prisoner before the IACHR, and won
their case before the Commission on the argument that mandatory sentencing did not afford the
defendant consideration of his individual personal circumstances or those of the crime. The
Hilaire v Trinidad and Tobago case, decided by the IACHR, was at that time before the InterAmerican Court but the lawyers cited their copy of the confidential report of the Commission
which they gave to the HRC and which clearly influenced the decision of the members of the
HRC in Thompson.
A comparative approach would have led the authors to give greater importance to the HRC’s
1983 decision to consider the mother of Elena Quinteros as much a victim as her daughter, due to
the “anguish and stress caused to the mother by the disappearance of her daughter” (96). Also,
reference to the European Court’s decision in the 1989 Soering case, holding that a decision to
extradite Soering to a country with the “death row syndrome” (i.e., “the very long period of time
spent on death row…with the ever present and mounting anguish of awaiting execution of the
death penalty”) and which would give rise to a breach of article 3 (cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment) would have assisted in an understanding of the HRC’s decision to go in a different
direction in the Ashby case (97), holding that detention on death row for a specific period of time
does not by itself violate article 7 of the Covenant. A discussion of such a reference would also
have given the views of the dissenting members of the HRC greater resonance.
The three authors do not approach the material in exactly the same way and Burchill, for
example, does make reference to the European Court, suggesting that the HRC should follow the
Court’s lead and view same-sex marriages as a human rights’ concern (216) in his discussion of
the rights of the family and children. Also, his consideration of developments regarding the
legalization of same-sex marriages in Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and Canada on this issue
assists in understanding the evolving historical context.
This text is an ambitious work which condenses into some 224 pages several decades’ worth of
case law decisions from the HRC, comprised of a constantly changing membership. Giving
coherence to this jurisprudence, by describing the case law in the way that they have chosen is no
small accomplishment, and distinguishes it from the encyclopedic approach undertaken in the
Nowak and the Joseph et al. commentaries. Ideally, this book would be read with a computer at
hand to pull up the cases and references to General Comments and Concluding Observations
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cited. It is an excellent addition to the libraries of international human rights practitioners and
scholars alike.
Christina M. Cerna, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Organization of American States
August 2005
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